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GUIDELINE
AMENDMENTS
DRAMATICALLY
CHANGE THE
STRUCTURE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL
FINES*
PAUL E. FIORELLI**
INTRODUCTION
As of November 1, 1991, companies that have "good ethics" will be
treated significantly better by the courts than those that do not. This
slight oversimplification is based upon amendments to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, submitted to Congress on May 1, 1991, which became
law on November 1, 1991. The amendments require federal judges to
multiply fines against organizations, by up to a factor of 4.0, or reduce
them by up to nine-five percent, depending upon an organization's toler-
ance towards, or vigilance against, violations.
Part I of this article will analyze the amendments and discuss: (1)
their historical development, (2) the sentencing goals, (3) the factors ana-
lyzed in determining whether fines will be increased or decreased, and (4)
what impact the new probation guidelines may have on organizations.
Part II is a call for new initiatives regarding corporate ethics programs.
* Copyright 1992, Paul E. Fiorelli.
** Downing Scholar-Mentor, Xavier University. I would like to thank Tracy Rigg for acting
as my research assistant and Downing Scholar, and Jack and Mary Kay Downing for fund-
ing the Downing Scholar-Mentor Program. I would also like to thank Robert Shank and Jeff
Martini for their help in researching this article.
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PART ONE
I. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
A. Historical Development
In 1984 Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission
(hereinafter referred to as either the "Sentencing Commission" or the
"Commission") to establish guidelines for consistent criminal sanctions
against organizations violating federal statutes.' The Commission was
charged with addressing sentencing questions dealing with both individu-
als (usually with respect to imprisonment) and organizations (usually
with respect to fines). The Commission first dealt with individual viola-
tors and in April of 1987 presented to Congress the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines." These guidelines became law on November 1, 1987, and their
constitutionality was immediately challenged in the case of Mistretta v.
United States.8 The case ultimately went to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and in an 8-1 decision (Scalia dissenting) the court upheld
the guidelines' constitutionality.
The Sentencing Commission must present new proposals to Congress
before May 1, of any given year, to be included in that year's amend-
ments.' If Congress does not change the proposals, they have the effect of
law on November 1 of the year presented. Since 1988, the Sentencing
Commission has been developing guidelines to deal with organizational
fines. It appeared that the Commission would be ready to present propos-
als to Congress before the May 1, 1990 deadline, but it decided to wait
another year to fill three vacancies in the seven-person Sentencing
Commission. 5
The remaining positions were filled during 1990 and the full Commis-
sion continued addressing the question of corporate fines by preparing
drafts, having public hearings, and soliciting comments from business-
people, academics, probation officers and attorneys.6 On May 1, 1991, the
Commission sent the proposed amendments to Congress. As they were
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (substantially codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (Supp.
IV), 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. IV 1985)).
2 U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,674, 44,675 (1987).
3 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The Petitioner was sentenced for the sale of cocaine to 18 months
imprisonment pursuant to the Guidelines. Id. at 371. The Petitioner argued, unsuccessfully,
that the Guidelines violated the separation of powers doctrine and were an excessive delega-
tion of authority to the Commission. Id. at 371-412.
28 U.S.C. § 994(p)(1988).
6 Fred Strasser, Lighter Corporate Sentencing, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
4 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR OR-
GANIZATIONS 2 (Aug. 30, 1991).
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unchallenged, the proposals became law on November 1, 1991.
B. Sentencing Goals
The stated goals of the Sentencing Commission's amendments are to
"provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organi-
zations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting and re-
porting criminal conduct."'7 The guidelines try to accomplish these goals
by: (1) providing victim restitution,8 (2) divesting crime-infested organi-
zations of their net assets,9 and (3) determining an appropriate, addi-
tional fine "based on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of
the organization."10
C. New Factors in Determining Fines
The amendments with the greatest impact on American business deal
with additional fines for organizations whose primary purpose was not to
engage in criminal activity. These fines are calculated by determining the
"seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organization." ' The
seriousness of the offense is determined by establishing a base fine, which
is the greatest of: (1) the pecuniary loss suffered by the victim, 2 (2) the
pecuniary gain received by the defendant organization," or (3) a penalty
determined by analyzing the Offense Level Fine Table.'(See Table 1).
Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law School believed prosecutors
would generally prefer the last calculation. "The defense won't stipulate,
judges are pressed, and prosecutors want to prosecute, not wrangle over
damages. '1 5
II. OFFENSE FINE LEVEL TABLE
The Offense Level Fine Table, seen below in Table 1, is calculated by
U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg. 22,786, 22,787 (1991) [hereinafter
"Guidelines"]. The Guidelines do not currently address either environmental or food and
drug violations. These areas will be addressed in future proposals.
' Guidelines § 8C3.3.(a). One of the most important goals is providing restitution to victims.
This is apparent by the Guidelines allowing a fine to be reduced or deferred, if it would
limit the ability of the defendant to repay the injured party.
" Id. § 8C1.1. Organizations with a primary purpose to engage in criminal activity were dealt
the harshest blow. The Guidelines permit the sentencing judge to construct a fine large
enough to disgorge the criminal organization of all of its net assets.
Id. at 22787.
" Id.
" Guidelines § 8C2.4.(a)(3).
Id. § 8C2.4.(a)(2).
Id. § 8C2.4.(a)(1).
" Fred Strasser, U.S. Panel Finishes Up Guidelines, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1991, at 3.
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using the base offense level, with any adjustments, as established in
Chapter Two of the Sentencing Guidelines. 6 The fine range from the Ta-
ble, before any multiplier or reducer is applied, is $5000 to $72,500,000.17
With maximum and minimum multipliers of 5% to 400%, this Table
range is effectively extended from $250 ($5,000 X 0.05) to $290,000,000
($72,500,000 X 4.0).18
" Guidelines § 8C2.3.(a).
7 Id. § '8C2.4.(d).
10 Id. § 8C2.6(d).
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TABLE 119
OFFENSE LEVEL FINE TABLE
OFFENSE LEVEL AMOUNT
6 OR LESS $ 5000
7 7500
8 10,000
9 15,000
10 20,000
11 30.000
12 40,000
13 60,000
14 85,000
15 125,000
16 175,000
17 250,000
18 350,000
19 500,000
20 650,000
21 910,000
22 1,200,000
23 1,600,000
24 2,100,000
25 2.800.000
26 3,700,000
27 4,800.000
28 6,300,000
29 8,100.000
30 10,500,000
31 13,500,000
32 17,500,000
33 22,000,000
34 28,500,000
35 36,000,000
36 45,500,000
37 57,500,000
38 OR MORE 72.500,000
9 Id. § 8C2.4.(d).
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III. CULPABILITY SCORE
Regardless of how the base fine is calculated, this amount can be ei-
ther increased or decreased, based on an organization's culpability score. 0
As may be seen from Table 2, for any given culpability score, the judge
has the discretion to impose a fine within a minimum and maximum
range.2 1 A higher culpability score establishes a higher minimum and
maximum range of multipliers. The maximum multiplier is 4.0, which has
the mathematic effect of multiplying a fine by 400%. A lower culpability
score decreases the minimum and maximum multipliers, which can dra-
matically reduce a fine. The minimum multiplier is 0.05, which has the
mathematic effect of dividing the fine by twenty.22
Table 22S
CULPABILITY MINIMUM MAXIMUM
SCORE MULTIPLIER MULTIPLIER
10 or more 2.00 4.00
8 1.60 3.20
7 1.40 2.80
6 1.20 2.40
5 1.00 2.00
4 0.80 1.60
3 0.60 1.20
2 0.40 0.80
1 0.20 0.40
0 or less 0.05 0.20
The culpability score starts with five points and may be either in-
creased or decreased based upon certain factors.2 ' The score will be in-
creased based upon the judge's determination of the: (1) size of the organ-
ization,2" (2) involvement of top officials, 26 (3) prior violations, 2 and (4)
obstruction of justice. 28 The culpability score will be decreased based
upon the judge's determination of whether the organization: (1) had an
I0 d. § 8C2.5.
Id. § 8C2.6.
Id.
*3 Id.
, Id. § 8C2.5.(a).
25 Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(1)(5).
2 Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(1)(A)(i).
', Id. § 8C2.5.(c).
I ld. § 8C2.5.(e).
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"effective program to prevent and detect violations, 29 (2) voluntarily dis-
closed its violations to the appropriate authority,30 (3) cooperated with an
investigation conducted by the appropriate authority,1 and (4) accepted
responsibility for its improper actions.2
IV. INCREASED SCORES
A. Size of the Organization
If the organization, or a unit of the organization, had 5000 or more
employees and an individual within high level personnel either: (1) partic-
ipated in, (2) condoned, or (3) was willfully ignorant of the offense, add
five points to the base score of five points for an aggregate of ten points.3 3
This addition to the base score decreases (assuming the same high level
participation or ignorance) with the decreasing size of the organization.
The respective decrease is: (1) four points for an organization or unit with
one thousand or more employees,34 (2) three points for an organization
with two hundred or more employees,3 5 (3) two points for an organization
with fifty or more employees,3 6 and (4) one point for an organization with
ten or more employees.37
A majority of the violations studied by the Sentencing Commission
involved participation by top level management. Table 3 recaps the Com-
mission's findings.3 8
2 Id. § 8C2.5.(f).
o Id. § 8C2.5.(g)(1).
31 Id. § 8C2.5.(g)(2).
" Id. § 8C2.5.(g)(3).
33 Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(1).
3- Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(2). Four points would be added to the five point base score, instead of five
points for larger organizations.
3. Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(3).
3, Id. . 8C2.5.(b)(4).
37 Id. § 8C2.5.(b)(5).
38 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE NEW FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZA-
TIONAL CRIMES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 3 (1991).
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Table 3
1988 1989
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
No managerial involvement identified 13 4.0% 5 1.8%
Owner of organization 169 51.5% 141 51.6%
Top executive 30 9.1% 44 16.1%
Manager 14 4.3% 19 7.0%
Employee 5 1.5% 3 1.1%
Unknown 97 29.6%. 61 22.3%
The Commission's rationale for increasing the penalty as an organi-
zation's size increases is based upon the thought that as a company gets
larger, its management becomes increasingly professional.8 9 The Commis-
sion also believed that when upper level managers of large corporations
tolerate illegal actions, they are not only abusing their position but are
also breaching the trust that has been placed in them.40 Also, if the toler-
ance is pervasive, there is an increased risk of other offenses being com-
mitted within the organization. 1
B. Prior History
Just as prior criminal activity was taken into account when determin-
ing prison sentences for individuals,' 2 prior violations of similar offenses
would have the effect of increasing the culpability score of organiza-
tions.48 The score is augmented by either one or two points depending on
how long ago the similar violation occurred and whether it was a criminal
versus a civil or administrative adjudication. Two points will be added to
the culpability score if "the organization . . . committed any part of the
instant offense less than five years after (A) a criminal adjudication based
on similar misconduct; or (B) civil or administrative adjudication(s) based
on two or more separate instances of similar misconduct . . . ."" One
point will be added if the abovementioned violation(s) occurred within
ten years.'"
It is interesting to note the differing treatment received by corpora-
tions that merge with an organization with a prior history, and a corpora-
" Guidelines § 8C2.5 (Background).
40 Id.
41 Id.
"' Guidelines Chapter 4.
4' Guidelines § 8C2.5.(c).
44 Id. § 8C2.5.(c)(2).
4 Id. § 8C2.5.(c)(1).
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tion that acquires substantially all the assets of an organization with a
prior history. If two organizations merge and maintain their respective
identities as separately-managed lines of business, each business retains
its prior history."6 But, "[I]f the company reorganized and became a new
legal entity, the new company would retain the prior history of the prede-
cessor company. 41 7
In addition to having both companies survive the merger, this carry-
over effect can be avoided by either: (1).the substantial purchase of all of
a company's assets,4 8 or (2) the acquisition of a company in response to a
Solicitation by federal government officials."9 Without this last exception,
healthy institutions could be very reluctant to acquire failing or failed
institutions (i.e., banks and savings and loans). Prior history of violations
should become a consideration in any future merger and acquisition
strategy.
C. Violation of an Order and Obstruction of Justice
The last two factors to consider in adding to a culpability score deal
with: (1) violation(s) of orders, and (2) obstruction of justice. If commit-
ting the instant offense violated a condition of probation, one point shall
be added to the culpability score." If committing the "instant offense vio-
lated a judicial order or injunction, other than a violation of a condition
of probation; or (B) if the organization . . . violated a condition of proba-
tion by engaging in similar misconduct .... add two points. 5 1 If the or-
ganization either obstructed, encouraged, aided, or willfully failed to pre-
vent, the obstruction of justice, an addition of three points is
appropriate.2
IV. DECREASED SCORES
Culpability scores have the effect of increasing the fine range for or-
ganizational "bad behavior" and significantly decreasing the range for or-
ganizational "good behavior." The firm can reduce its culpability score by
up to eight points by complying with the Commission's ethics recommen-
dations. This "carrot and stick" approach will provide a strong incentive
for organizations to: (1) implement effective programs to detect and pre-
vent violations, (2) disclose violations to the appropriate authorities, (3)
, Id. § 8C2.5. (Commentary, Application Notes: 6).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
60 Id. § 8C2.5.(d)(2).
Id. § 8C2.5.(d)(1).
, Id. § 8C2.5.(e).
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cooperate in any investigation, and (4) accept responsibility for any viola-
tions. Saying that "Good Ethics is Good Business" may seem cliche, but
it takes on a new meaning when analyzing the bottom line impact of fines
on organizations that comply with the guidelines, compared with those
that violate them.
A. Effective Programs to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law
In 1990, the Behavior Research Center conducted a comprehensive
survey of ethics programs for the Ethics Resource Center.53 The survey
included a cross sectional analysis of many diverse companies. The survey
included large and small companies, defense contractors, retailers, agri-
cultural, Business Roundtable members and many other representative
groups. While eighty-five percent of the respondents claimed that they
had a code of ethics, or other policy statement, 54 only thirty-six percent of
the same companies stated that their monitoring efforts were very effec-
tive.5 Forty-nine percent said their programs were somewhat effective, 5'
and eight percent said that their programs were not very effective. 7
While a surprisingly high number of companies had written policies,
it is equally surprising that fifty-seven percent of the participants stated
that the monitoring efforts were only somewhat or not very effective.
These statistics lead one to believe that there is a difference between
merely having written policies and having an effective ethics program.
The Sentencing Commission agrees that written codes alone will not
entitle an organization to a three point reduction in the culpability score.
"The hallmark of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of
law is that the organization exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent
and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents."5 8 The
"minimum requirements" to qualify for the culpability score reduction
based on an effective program to detect and prevent violations will be
based on an organization: (1) having compliance standards and proce-
dures that are reasonably capable of reducing criminal conduct,59 (2) spe-
cifically designating high level individuals within the organization to over-
53 TE .ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER AND THE BEHAVIOR RESEARCH CENTER, ETHICS POLICIES
AND PROGRAMS IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1990).
s Id. at 6.
6' Id. at 41.
56 Id.
67 d.
Guidelines § 8A1.2. (Commentary, Application Notes: 3(k)). See Paul E. Fiorelli, Fine
Reductions Through Effective Ethics Program, 56 ALB. L. REV. 403 (1992) (discussing com-
panies that establish ethics programs).
" Guidelines § 8A1.2.(k)(1).
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see the program,6 (3) exercising due care not to delegate significant
authority to a person known to have criminal tendencies,61 (4) developing
a method of communicating the policies and procedures to all employees
and other agents either by ethics training or distributing practical publi-
cations explaining the program,"' (5) taking steps to "achieve compliance
with its standards,... by utilizing monitoring and auditing systems rea-
sonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its employees ... and by
having in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees ...
could report criminal conduct by others within the organization without
fear of retribution,"6 (6) consistently enforcing the standards through
"appropriate disciplinary mechanisms",6" and (7) taking the necessary
steps to prevent any similar occurrences in the future, including modify-
ing the ethics program.6 5
B. Self Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Responsibility
Even without an effective program to detect and prevent violations,
an organization can reduce its culpability score by: (1) voluntarily disclos-
ing information about violations, (2) cooperating with any subsequent in-
vestigation, and (3) accepting responsibility, which usually takes the form
of a guilty plea. If you merely accept responsibility, you may receive a one
point deduction. 6 To underscore the seriousness associated with ac-
cepting responsibility, the judge may require the organization's chief ex-
ecutive officer to be present at the sentencing.6" If you also fully cooperate
in the investigation you receive a two point (total) reduction. 8 If you ac-
cept responsibility, fully cooperate, and voluntarily disclose the informa-
tion to the appropriate authority, an organization can reduce its culpabil-
ity score by five points.69 Given that the base culpability score is five, if
the defendant had no aggravating factors that would add to the score, the
defendant's culpability score would be zero, which would mitigate the fine
from a maximum of twenty percent of the base amount, to a possible
minimum of five percent of the base fine.7 0
Id. at (k)(2).
Id. at (k)(3).
e' Id. at (k)(4).
13 Id. at (k)(5).
Id. at (k)(6).
" Id. at (k)(7).
" Id. § 8C2.5.(g)(3).
6 Id. § 8C2.5. (Commentary, Application Notes: 14).
88 Id. at (g)(2).
Id. at (g)(1).
70 Id. § 8C2.6. See Table 2.
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Self-Reporting
Perhaps the self reporting provision requires managers to take the
largest leap of faith. When managers discover potential problems, human
nature tells them to cover up, rather than open up. Even though manag-
ers might become aware of a problem employee or problem process, they
wonder whether governmental authorities will ever find out. If they wait
long enough, perhaps the problem will go away, or they will have a differ-
ent job and it will be someone else's problem.
To encourage self-reporting, the guidelines provide a three point
marginal reduction in the culpability score for organizations that report
an offense to the appropriate government authority.7 1 To receive the re-
duction, the organization itself must make the report." This means that a
business cannot attempt to use unsanctioned reports by "whistleblowers"
to decrease its fine range. The report must be voluntary, and not a last
minute response to an imminent investigation by the authorities.73 This
does not mean that an organization must report every rumor upon receipt
of the allegation. The business can take a reasonable time to investigate
the complaint, but it must ultimately disclose all relevant information to
receive the three point marginal reduction.7 4
C. Probation
The amendments dealing with organizational probation contain
guidelines which judges must follow and policy statements which they
may follow. Section 8D1.1.(a) of the Guidelines requires a judge to impose
probation if: (1) "such sentence is necessary to secure payment of restitu-
tion,... enforce a remedial order .... or ensure completion of community
service, '75 (2) the organization is unable to pay a monetary fine1 6 (3) the
organization has more than fifty employees and it did not have an effec-
tive program to prevent and detect violations, 7 (4) the organization en-
gaged in similar wrongdoings within five years before the sentencing, 8 (5)
a high level official of the organization participated in the offense and had
engaged in similar misconduct within five years before the sentencing,7
" Guidelines § 8C2.5.(g)(1). The three point marginal reduction is calculated by comparing
the five point reduction for self-reporting, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility with
the two point reduction for cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.
" Id. § 8C2.5. (Commentary, Application Notes: 12).
" Id. § 8C2.5.(g)(1)(A).
" Id. § 8C1.5 (Commentary, Application Notes: 12).
71 Id. § 8D1.1.(a)(1).
7" Id. at (a)(2).
" Id. at (a)(3).
" Id. at (a)(4).
" Id. at (a)(5).
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(6) this type of sentence is required to change the organization to de-
crease the probability that similar events will happen in the future,80 (7)
the sentence does not include a fine, 81 or (8) it is "necessary to accomplish
one or more of the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C.
3553(a)(2)."2
The term of probation shall not exceed five years," and in the case of
a felony, shall be at least one year.84 One of the conditions of probation is
"that an organization shall not commit another federal, state or local
crime during the term of probation." 85 Another condition of probation for
felonies is that, unless extraordinary circumstances exist which would
make this imposition unreasonable, the court will impose at least one of
the following: (1) fine, (2) restitution, or (3) community service.86
While the abovementioned probation guidelines are mandatory, the
discretionary policy statements offer judges the latitude to design a sen-
tence tailored tothe individual organization. Judges may require organi-
zations to publicize their conviction and how they plan to prevent future
violations.87 If there is a question about whether a company is able to pay
a fine, the court can have outside experts or probation officers conduct
unannounced audits of the company's books and records.88 The company
will have to pay all costs associated with hiring these outside experts. If
the organization did not have an effective program to prevent and detect
violations, it may be required to submit one for the court's approval. 89
This would include a schedule for implementation. Any violation of the
abovementioned conditions would permit the court to revoke probation
and resentence the organization."0
The guideline amendments should change the emphasis organiza-
tions have placed on ethics programs. Traditionally, ethics were fine as
long as they did not interfere with business. Companies should examine
their ethics programs and policies on self-disclosure and cooperation.
Failing to do so could cost them significantly more money in fines if the
company is convicted of violations after November 1, 1991.
SO Id. at (a)(6).
s Id. at (a)(7).
" Id. at (a)(8).
Id. § 8DI.2.(a)(2).
, Id. at (a)(1).
8 Id. § 8D1.3.(a).
Id. § 8DI.3.(b).
8 Id. § 8D1.4.(a).
Id. § 8DI.4.(b)(2).
"' Id. § 8D1.4.(c)(1).
*o Id. § 8D1.5.
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PART Two
I. ETHICS RECOMMENDATION
Companies can no longer rest on their laurels of dusty codes, while
sending explicit or implicit signals to employees to disregard the code of
ethics. 1 Top management must create an environment in which "doing
the right thing" becomes second nature. Employees must know that if
they report an improper procedure, the procedure, and not the reporter,
will be corrected.
Organizations must commit resources to this process by placing high
level, respected managers in a position to develop effective ethics pro-
grams. Without high level personnel championing ethics programs, ethics
will remain a low priority. Unless employees believe that their company is
serious about ethics, there is no reason for them to report problems or
change improper behavior. They will not risk their careers if the company
does not support their "ethical" positions.
A. Training
All employees must be either trained or retrained about the com-
pany's true values. The organization's code of ethics should be the em-
ployee's guiding light. It should be both readable and somewhat flexible.
Readable, so employees can understand and accept its provisions, and
flexible enough to allow the company to adapt to any required future
changes.
In the past, when a company's Code of Ethics came in conflict with
business practices, the code lost. This must change. Companies have to do
more than pay lip service to codes of ethics. They must breathe new life
into their codes, and convince their employees that not all business is
"good business." The company must support employees who refuse to act
illegally or unethically. Without reinforcing corporate values, organiza-
tions send employees the message, "Do whatever it takes, just don't get
caught. And by the way, if you do get caught, you're on your own."
B. Consistency
Violators must be treated consistently. Guideline Section 8A1.2.
states that one requirement of an effective program to prevent and detect
violations is that "the standards must have been consistently enforced
through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate,
' For further explanation about signals sent by managers to employees see Paul Fiorelli,
Winking Through the Blindfold: What Motivates White Collar Criminals?, 21 AKRON L.
REV. 327 (1988).
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discipline of individuals responsible for the failure to detect an offense. ' 92
Managers cannot be "blinded by production" or make exceptions -based
upon performance."' One example of this would be if cheating on an ac-
count is wrong, the star salesperson should receive similar disciplinary
action as the average salesperson. Without this sense of consistency, em-
ployees will believe that it does not matter what you do, just who you
know. When employees see these discrepancies, they become disheart-
ened and cynical about the company's code.
C. Additional Reporting Mechanisms
Companies should set up Additional Reporting Mechanisms
("A.R.M.") to handle situations when the traditional method of reporting
to a supervisor is inappropriate. A.R.M. is used instead of "whistleblower
hotline" because the term "whistleblower" conjures up negative images of
disgruntled employees. Unfortunately, very few people think of
whistleblowers as "loyal company employees," "workers with a con-
science," or "corporate heroes."
Employees may want to use an A.R.M. when a supervisor is either
directly involved in the problem (i.e., sexual harassment) or has totally
disregarded past complaints (i.e., failure to respond to a misvouchering
claim). A.R.M.s are a required part of the Guidelines' "effective programs
to prevent and detect violations." "The organization must have taken rea-
sonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards.. . and by having
in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees and other
agents could report criminal conduct by others within the organization
without fear of retribution."9
Many defense contractors already have A.R.M.s in place. In 1986,
thirty-three major contractors voluntarily became signatories to the De-
fense Industry Initiative (DII).9 5 In 1990, the number rose to forty-five. In
the 1990 DII Report, all forty-five signatories answered the following
question affirmatively-"Is there a corporate review board, ombudsman,
corporate compliance, or ethics office or similar mechanism for employees
to report suspected violations to someone other than their direct supervi-
sor, if necessary?" '9 6 Ombudsmen, ethics officers or review boards, are all
examples of A.R.M.s. Management must understand that A.R.M.s are
Id. § 8A1.2. (Commentary, Application Notes: (k)(6)).
" Interview with James Helms, Vice President of Agency, Western-Southern Life Insurance
Company (Oct. 28, 1991).
" Guidelines § 8A1.2. (Commentary, Application Notes: 3(k)(5)).
"6 For an overview of ethics in the defense industry see Paul Fiorelli, In Defens'e of Ethics:
New Considerations After the Packard Commission, 34 CATH. LAW. 157 (1991).
" DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE PUBLIC AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY 11 (1991).
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meant to supplement, not supersede, the traditional line of corporate
communication and should not be perceived as a threat.
II. NEUTRALITY
A.R.M.ers (people using A.R.M.s) must believe that their careers will
not be affected by reporting suspected violations. A.R.M.ers are prisoners
of circumstances, who cannot ignore their knowledge of potential wrong-
doings. Companies should not kill the messenger; rather they should deal
with the message. The A.R.M.er must believe that an independent party,
(i.e., an Ombudsman) will conduct a thorough, expedient investigation.
The Ombudsman will make appropriate recommendations, and should
have enough authority within the organization to have the recommenda-
tions followed.
III. ANONYMITY
Whenever possible, the A.R.M.er's identity should be confidential.
Ombudsmen must balance the privacy rights of the accuser against the
reputation rights of the accused. After the initial report, the only time it
would be necessary to know the A.R.M.er's identity would be if the inves-
tigator believed that the complaint was maliciously filed to injure some-
one's reputation. At this point, the A.R.M.er should be disciplined. Em-
ployees under suspicion must believe that an investigation will only be
initiated based upon substantial evidence, and not rumors. There should
be no stigma attached to their reputation if the investigation is either
inconclusive or establishes their innocence.
CONCLUSION
Before the Sentencing Commission's submission of guidelines dealing
with organizational fines, discussions of ethics programs were typically re-
served for academics. The amended guidelines place a premium on an
organization's detection and prevention of problems through effective
ethics programs. Once detected, potential problems should not be ignored
or "covered up." They must be thoroughly investigated, and if an actual
violation did occur, ultimately disclosed. Organizations should cooperate
with, rather than obstruct, investigations by the appropriate authorities.
Once an investigation has established a violation, the company should ad-
mit the wrongdoing and try to modify its behavior to prevent similar of-
fenses in the future.
Congress has provided adequate incentives and deterrents to influ-
ence changes in organizational behavior. This change will not be easy, and
can only be accomplished by a strong commitment to ethics from top ex-
ecutives. Codes of ethics must be revisited and revitalized. Employees
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must feel they are being treated fairly and consistently. Companies
should institute A.R.M.s and the entire organization should be trained on
how to properly use an A.R.M. Employees must believe that management
is willing to listen to and deal with the problems they encounter. Once
these changes become part of the corporate culture, an organization will
be less culpable for its mistakes and more deserving of lenient treatment
through reduced fines.

